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Damage Suits and the Contagious
Principle of Workmen's
Compensation*
Wex S. Malonet
PROFESSOR SMITH'S PROPHECY
There is an interesting parallel in literature between the
bitter and agonized protests of Jeremiah, the great prophet of
the Bible, and the later writings of Professor Jeremiah Smith,
who was a distinguished professor of law at Harvard during the
first years of the present century and who was one of the titans
of legal thought during this period. Jeremiah Smith, like the
tragic biblical prophet whose name he bore, was profoundly
concerned over the languishing of morality in his time. His
anxiety, however, was over a decline of the moral element in
the law. He foresaw with dismay that the requirement of blame-
worthiness on the part of the defendant in accident litigation
was destined for extinction.
Professor Smith had done his creative work during the last
part of the Nineteenth Century, and he had been a contempo-
rary witness of the final triumph of the moral element in tort
law. He, like other legal scholars of that period, had observed
the emergence of the idea that liability for harm must depehd
upon ethical blameworthiness, and that an innocent defendant
should not be saddled with damages for a hurt which he could
not avoid. Students of legal history know that the notion that
fault is essential to liability was not characteristic of the early
common law.' The requirement of moral blameworthiness is a
relative newcomer in our legal system. It came into being as a
product of the industrial revolution and the increasing dangers
* The present article is published concurrently in the May, 1952, issue
of the NACCA Law Journal.
t Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97 (1908); Wigmore, Respon-
sibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 383 (1894); Isaacs,
Fault and Liability, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 954 (1918). Cf. Holmes, The Common
Law, Lecture I (1881).
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of steam propelled railway traffic which was characteristic of
the eighteen hundreds. 2 Courts came to the realization that
absolute liability would unduly discourage the infant industrial
and transportation enterprises of this period. They felt that they
should offer enterprise the opportunity of conducting itself with
reasonable respect for the safety of others as a means of avoid-
ing responsibility. When the requirement of fault finally emerged
transcendent, it was hailed by scholars and lawyers as the
crowning triumph of reason and, morality toward which the
common law had been groping for centuries.
To Professor Jeremiah Smith and his contemporaries the
notion that no person should be held except for his own fault
was more than a gain in the field of morality. For the scholar
of that time the general requirement of fault represented at last
a unifying principle which had emerged to bring together as i
rational science of torts what had formerly been a mere indis-
criminate collection of isolated wrongs. The idea of a single and
universal requirement of fault lent logical consistency to the
law. It made possible the erection of a structure of reason in
what was formerly a tangled field of disordered anomalies, and
as such it deserved a vigilant guardianship by legal scholars. Any
threat to its continued prosperity deserved to be ferreted out,
exposed and exterminated if possible lest it spread like a cancer
and destroy the newly acquired blessing in its infancy. This,
then, was the intellectual climate that prevailed when Jeremiah
Smith was at the height of his career in 1913, the year in which
he made the observation with which we are presently concerned.
Let us now see how and why he became the embittered prophet
of doom.
Even as the notion of required fault was wrapping its last
firm tendril around the law of torts in America there was devel-
oping in continental Europe a new and entirely alien idea of
liability represented by the German Workmen's Compensation
Act of 1884.3 German industrial employers were being required
by statute to shoulder part of the cost of accidental injuries and
deaths for their employees quite without reference as to whether
or not the employer was to blame for the tragedy. Under the
German Compensation Act it was enough that the victim was
2. Green, Judge and Jury, 106-143 (1930); Winfield, History of Negli-
gence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. Rev. 184, 195 (1926); Malone, The Forma-
tive Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 151 (1946), No. 286 Ins.
L.J. 839 (1946).
8. Unfallversicherungsgesetz, yomre 6. Juli 1884.
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an employee and that the accident occurred during the course
of his employment. In other words, the requirement of moral
fault as a condition to liability had begun to lose out on the
continent just at the moment it had gained its final hold on the
thoughtways of America.
Furthermore, the compensation movement was spreading
over Europe like wildfire. By the turn of the century the prin-
ciple of workmen's compensation had been adopted over prac-
tically all the continent and in the British Isles as well.4 Ten
years later the great industrial state of New York had adopted a
compensation statute, and by 1913 at least twenty states, from
New Hampshire to Nevada, were securely within the compensa-
tion fold. These states represented more than half the popula-
tion of the nation. Moreover, the field of industrial accidents
embraced the great bulk of all personal injury litigation in that
year, 1913. At that time the automobile was still a comparatively
harmless newcomer and the great toll of traffic accidents on our
highways had not yet assumed serious proportions. Apart from
injuries and deaths suffered on the tracks of railways, there
was comparatively little accident litigation outside industrial
operations.
As matters stood, then, fault as an essential basis of liability
prevailed for practical purposes in only a comparatively small
area of the accident field. Within a short period of three years
the fault principle, which had so painfully won its way, found
itself suddenly forced into serious competition with the novel
and completely alien notion of absolute liability represented by
the workmen's compensation movement.
It was in this year, 1913, that Professor Jeremiah Smith
published in the Harvard Law Review his foreboding prophecy
that the requirement of moral fault, like the Valhalla of Norse
mythology, was destined for complete extinction." After point-
ing out at length that the classical fault theory and the principle
of workmen's compensation are completely irreconcilable in
every respect, he then indicated that there is nothing peculiar
to the employment relationship which justifies treating the claim
of the injured employee in one way while the rights of a
4. Other foreign countries which enacted workmen's compensation laws
prior to 1902 were: Austria, 1887; Norway, 1894; Finland, 1895; Denmark,
Italy and France, 1898; Spain and New Zealand, 1900; Netherlands, Greece
and Sweden, 1901; Luxembourg, 1902.
5. Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 235,
344 (1914).
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stranger are adjusted according to an entirely different notion.
For the same accident two diametrically opposed principles may
be brought into play and the results for the various parties
involved cannot be reconciled.
Although Professor Smith, true to the individualistic temper
of his time,6 deplored the compensation movement, he readily
conceded that the tide of workmen's compensation could not be
stemmed. He asserted with confidence that the compensation
principle and the fault theory of tort law could not continue to
coexist side by side. As compensation becomes more entrenched
and more familiar, he asserted, traditional tort theory will of
necessity give way in all areas of accident law. He pushed aside
any suggestion that workmen's compensation, resting upon a
statutory foundation and directed toward a single social evil,
could be isolated for employees' injuries alone. There will follow
inevitably, he said, a spilling over of the no-fault principal into
all areas of accident law. This was his prediction.
Then, like the Jeremiah of the old testament, he despairingly
counselled the opening of the gate and a surrender to the invader,
the "godless" principle of workmen's compensation. He showed
how he believed the deterioration of the requirement of blame-
worthiness might take place. He expressed doubt that it would
be openly abandoned in the decisions. He predicted instead that
courts would continue to talk the language of fault while at the
same time they would manipulate accepted theories so as to
relieve plaintiffs of the practical necessity of introducing proof
that fault actually existed. Absence of negligence would become
a matter of defense. After throwing upon defendants the burden
of exonerating themselves from blame, the courts would make
this burden more and more difficult until finally it would be-
come virtually impossible to discharge. In this way a gradual
metamorphosis of tort law would take place, until finally the
empty shell of moral responsibility would be cast aside and
the new liability, resting on economic considerations alone, would
emerge full-fledged. The principle of workmen's compensation
would then become universal principle for all accidents, and
tort law based upon fault, as it existed in 1900, would have
disappeared.7
6. Other contemporary writing of the time: Mechem, Employer's Lia-
bility, 4 Ill. L. Rev. 243 (1909); Dines, Employers' Liability, 1909 Mo. Bar Ass'n
171-188 (1909).
7. Smith, supra note 5, at 344, 368.
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THE PROPHECY APPRAISED
To what extent, if any, has Professor Jeremiah Smith's
prophecy been fulfilled? Certainly his ultimate prediction of the
complete disappearance of fault has not yet been realized in
this country. American courts still talk the language of negli-
gence, and in most instances they state solemnly that the law
requires that the victim prove the existence of carelessness or
blameworthy conduct by producing evidence. In this country
compensation is still restricted to workmen who are injured or
killed in their employment, and more than thirty-five years
elapsed after Professor Smith wrote before the compensation
principle achieved universal recognition even in the field of
industrial accidents.8 The advent of the motor vehicle shortly
after Smith uttered his prophecy served to bring the immense
field of automobile traffic accidents within the fold of established
fault principles. On the surface, then, it appears that orthodox
tort law based on moral blameworthiness of the defendant has
held its own in the United States.
It is true that even before 1920 there was considerable
advocacy for an extension of the principle of workmen's com-
pensation beyond the industrial accident field. Reputable writers
advocated the use of the new principle for all automobile acci-
dents9 and also for injuries and deaths inflicted on both passen-
gers and third persons through the operation of railroads.'0 These
advocacies increased" until finally in 1928 the Columbia Univer-
sity Council for Research in the Social Sciences appointed a
distinguished committee of judges, lawyers and scholars to study
the problem of compensation for automobile accidents.12 After
8. Employee injuries and deaths in interstate railroad operations are
still litigated according to a modified fault principle under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. In recent years there has been increasing agitation
for the adoption of the compensation principle in this field. See 74 A.B.A. Rep.
108 (1949); Pollack, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Work Injuries
and Diseases, 36 Cornell L.Q. 236 (1951). The arguments against the proposed
extension are set forth in Richter and Forer, The Railroad Industry and
Work-Incurred Disabilities, 36 Cornell L.Q. 203 (1951).
9. Carman, Is a Motor Vehicle Compensation Act Advisable?, 4 Minn.
L. Rev. 1 (1919); Rollins, A Proposal To Extend the Compensation Principle
To Accidents in the Streets, 4 Mass. L.Q. 392 (1919).
10. Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29
HIarv. L. Rev. 705 (1916).
11. Elsbree and Roberts, Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle
Accidents, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 690 (1928); Workmen's Compensation and
Compulsory Automobile Casualty Insurance, 12 Va. L. Reg. (n.s.) 33 (1926).
12. The prominence and the diversified qualifications of the committee
is indicated by the membership: Arthur A. Ballantine (Chairman), Joseph P.
Chamberlain, Charles E. Clark, Miles M. Dawson, Walter F. Dodd, Victor F.
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three years of intensive work, including an exhaustive investiga-
tion of cases and house-to-house canvassing for information on
'the aftermath of automobile accidents and personal injury litiga-
tions, this committee recommended in strong language that a
statute modeled after the New York and Massachusetts Work-
men's Compensation Act be adopted in place of the law of
negligence and other fault doctrine in the field of automobile
accidents.'8 The prestige and practical soundmindedness of this
committee carried some weight in legislative halls throughout
the country. In New York, Connecticut, Wisconsin and Virginia
serious consideration was given to the adoption of the compensa-
tion principle for all automobile accidents, and a constitutional
amendment to make possible such a scheme was introduced in
the New York State Constitutional Convention of 1938.14 All
efforts, however, have proved abortive. In no American juris-
diction has such a measure reached final passage, and liability
based on fault still prevails with variation throughout this
country. In England in 1932 a plan analogous to the one recom-
mended by the Columbia Council was adopted by the House of
Lords, only to be tabled in Commons.15
CHANGES IN THE FAULT CONCEPT UNDER
JURY-LESS SYSTEMS
From this brief account of the fate which has met all efforts
to make forthright doctrinal changes in the United States and
in England, it is clear that if we are to find a frontal attack upon
the fault principle, we shall have to look elsewhere.
The problem of compensation for automobile accidents is
universal, despite the fact that here in the United States we feel
the impact of the problem more acutely because of the tremen-
dous amount of motor vehicle traffic that prevails on our streets
and highways. But automobiles have suddenly made life more
dangerous everywhere in the world, and the lawyers and judges
Dowling, Henry S. Drenkes, Jr., William Draper Lewis, Robert S. Marx,
Ogden L. Mills, William A. Schnader, Bernard L. Shientag, Horace Stern,
Henry W. Taft.
13. Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile
Accidents (Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences)
(1932). The plan is described and defended in French, The Automobile Com-
pensation Plan (1933).
14. Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation,
50 Col. L. Rev. 300, 318, n. 79 (1950), No. 330 Ins. L.J. 492, n. 79 (1950).
15. Butterworth, Road Accidents: The Compensation Problems, 14 J.
Comp. Leg. & Int. L. 189 (1932).
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of foreign countries have had even more difficulty than we have
had in adjusting their. legal machinery to the new problem.
Their task has been more difficult than ours because conti-
nental law has not had the benefit of the jury, which, in this
country, outside Louisiana, can serve to absorb much of the
shock of any transition away from fault liability. When our
American negligence law fails to meet the demand of an automo-
bile infested society our judges can humanize our doctrines
simply by passing more and more of the problems of liability
into the hands of the lay juryman. In this way the rugged and
uncompromising doctrines of common law find a most effective
counterfoil in the non-legal and human impulses of the jury-
men.'8 In other words, for the plaintiff the common law of torts
looks much tougher on paper than it proves to be in the court
room. We enjoy the practical advantage of being able to retain
our formal doctrines virtually intact in the law books and yet
revolutionize the practical application of those doctrines by the
way we administer them.
Continental law, on the other hand, sounds more flexible
and perhaps looks better on paper. But if a major alteration is
required under any civilian system, the doctrines must be com-
pletely overhauled by the legislature or the courts. Here in
America a frontal attack upon the requirement of negligence
would not become necessary until we have completely exploited
the possibilities of using the jury as a foil. In cases where the
plaintiff is unable to muster up more than a possible suggestion
of negligence the court can nevertheless submit the case to the
jury and depend upon the jurymen to ignore largely the issue
of fault, particularly if the defendant is insured or is otherwise
able to stand the loss by reason of his prosperity. Therefore,
formal changes in our tort law are frequently little more than
legislative or judicial confirmations of habits of thinking that
jurymen have followed for years. This was true of the statutory
-abolition of the fellow servant rule in this country. Long
before that evil rule was abolished by legislation jurymen had
followed the practice of ignoring it in reaching their verdicts.' 7
The same is true of the issue of contributory negligence, which,
16. "It is a current forensic commonplace that a very effective method
of destroying in action an unjust or unpopular rule of law is to delegate its
application to the jury." Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presump-
tions, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906, 909 (1931).
17. Green, Judge and Jury 122-123 (1930).
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in some states, such as Mississippi and Wisconsin, has finally
been abolished by statute. Every practicing lawyer in a common
law state knows that if the jury gets the issue of contributory
negligence, it will probably ignore the plaintiff's fault, except as
a factor to be considered in reducing the amount of the verdict.'
In the entire field of accident litigation the jury has been
remaking the law in many areas. In some respects the jurymen
have been ahead of the judge and legislator for over a hundred
years.19 This observation is to a large extent true of the basic
requirement of negligence or fault. It is not likely to be formally
abolished in this country until after the possibilities of recourse
to the jury have been exploited to the fullest extent possible.
It is natural, therefore, to find that the first radical changes
in fault doctrines have taken place in those countries whose
accident law is administered by the judge alone, and where
reform must take place through outright doctrinal change.
THE EMERGENCE OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY FOR MOTOR
VEHICLE ACCIDENTS IN FRANCE
The most surprising developments on the European conti-
nent in the law relative to motor vehicle accidents have taken
place in France. In that country an obscure article of the Civil
Code has suddenly been resurrected and completely reinterpreted
by the French courts so as to result in virtual absolute liability
for the driver of a motor vehicle. In France the traditional fault
basis of liability is in danger of complete extinction in the auto-
mobile accident field.
The law of torts in France is contained in three or four
brief articles of the French Civil Code. Principally these are
Articles 1382 through 1384 of the Code Napoleon. They appear
almost verbatim as Articles 2315 through 2324 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870. Article 1382 of the French Code lays down
the broad principle that tort liability is based on fault.20 Thus
French law starts with the same assumption as the common
law of 1900-no blameless person should be held for any harm
18. See the very acute observations of an able and experienced trial
judge in Ulman, A Judge Takes the Stand 31 (1933); Malone, Contributory
Negligence and Landowner Cases, 29 Minn. L. Rev. 61, 62 (1944).
19. See, in general, James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence
Cases, 58 Yale L.J. 667, 685 et seq. (1949).
20. Art. 1382: "Any act by which a person causes damage to another
makes the person by whose fault the damage occurred liable to make repara-
tion for such damage." (Italics supplied.)
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which he could not have avoided. There must be an evil inten-
tion, or recklessness, or at least that failure to use reasonable
care which we and the French call negligence or imprudence.
For nearly a hundred years after the adoption of the code no
French judge, lawyer or writer doubted that this requirement
of fault was essential in nearly every case of injury. Also, just
as in this country and in England, the plaintiff was obliged to
introduce affirmative evidence of fault as a part of his case.
Particular attention is called to another article in the French
Civil Code which follows almost on the toes of Article 1382.
This is Article 1384, which (with certain additions not important
for present purposes) provides "A person is liable not only for
the damage which was caused by his own act, but also for the
damage caused by the acts of persons for whom he is responsible,
or the acts of things which he has under his care." It is this
part relating to liability for things with which we are presently
concerned.
Up until the closing years of the last century it was assumed
that this article was merely an elaboration on the familiar fault
principle of Article 1382. It was assumed that a person should
be made liable for the damage caused by an inanimate thing
under his care if the thing was carelessly kept, maintained or
operated by him, or if he had knowledge of its dangerous condi-
tion and failed to take proper precautions, but not otherwise.21
In fact the highest court of appeal, the Court of Cassation,
expressly so held in 1870.22 No one dreamed at that time that
this innocuous sounding provision of the Civil Code could serve
as the germ of an entirely new specie of liability in which the
fault of the defendant would be immaterial.
The first indication that the French courts were prepared to
depart from the fault requirement where the injury was caused
by some inanimate thing came in a decision in 1896.23 A boat
engineer named Teffaine, working for defendants, owners of the
boat, was killed when the boiler exploded. The facts tended to
indicate that there was defective welding for which the boiler
21. See, for example, Fenet, Recueil Complet des Travaux Pr~paratoires
du Code Civil 478, 487-490 (1836) (discussion by Torrible).
22. Painvain c. Deschamps, S.1871.I.9. In this case plaintiff was Injured
by the unexplained explosion of a laundry boiler. He instituted suit under
Article 1384. The court refused to hold defendant liable because plaintiff
had not introduced affirmative evidence of fault. It is noteworthy that even
under the common law plaintiff could probably have relied upon res ipsa
loquitur. See cases collected in annotation, 23 A.L.R. 484 (1923).
23. Guissez, Cousin et Oriolle c. Veuve Teffaine, D.1897.I.433.
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manufacturer was responsible, but which, admittedly, was not
discoverable by the boat owners. Teffaine's widow sued, under
Article 1384 and she was allowed recovery against the owners.
They were not permitted to defend on the ground that the acci-
dent was due to the carelessness of the boilermaker, nor were
they allowed to show that the defect in the boiler was hidden.
The court observed that where an injury is inflicted by some
object or thing under the defendant's care, the defendant is abso-
lutely liable for the loss.2 4 It announced that when suit is insti-
tuted under Article 1384 only two defenses are available: The
defendant might show that the accident was due to an unfore-
seen event, or to an Act of God. But a showing of absence of
negligence was not enough.
This decision threw the French law into a state of confusion
and raised innumerable problems which were not resolved for
the next thirty years. To any English lawyer of that time the
Teffaine case would not have come as a surprise; for in 1865,
thirty years earlier, in the famous case, Rylands v. Fletcher,25
the English House of Lords had announced that any one who
keeps upon his property a dangerous thing whose tendency is to
explode or otherwise escape, keeps the thing at his peril. One
might fairly suspect that the new interpretation of Article 1384
of the French Civil Code was influenced in part by the English
rule. But this important distinction should be borne in mind:
the English law had not yet fully accepted the fault principle at
the time of the Rylands v. Fletcher decision. The common law
was then still in a transitional state, and Rylands v. Fletcher
was supported in principle by a respectable body of earlier
authorities. 26 On the other hand, the French had assumed for a
century that fault was required. Furthermore, the Rylands v.
Fletcher doctrine was restricted to things of an unusually dan-
gerous character which were not in common everyday use, and
it has been applied with increasing caution during recent years,2
24. The defendant argued: (1) The liability for the acts of things im-
posed by Article 1384 is restricted to injuries done by animals and ruinous
buildings. These two sources of harm are dealt with specifically in Articles
1385 and 1386 of the French Civil Code; (2) the boiler was not under the
care (garde) of defendants at the time of accident.
25. 3 Hurlstone & Coltman 774 (1865), L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affirmed
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
26. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 298,
311 (1911).
27. Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land,
3 Camb. L.J. 376 (1929). See particularly, Read v. J. Lyons and Co. Ltd.
[1946] 2 All Eng. Rep. 471, noted in 8 LoUISIANA LAw REVIEW 155 (1947).
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while the new interpretation of the French Article 1384 applies
to any injury inflicted by any thing under the defendant's care,
however innocuous the thing might appear to be.
A better explanation of Teffaine's case lies in the fact that it
involved an injury to an industrial worker. Years before the
decision was handed down the neighboring Germans had adopted
the first workmen's compensation act in history, and at the very
moment Teffaine's case was under consideration the English were
.favorably debating a similar statute which was adopted the fol-
lowing year. It is not unlikely that the French court of appeal
felt that it would be wise to protect the French worker from
the dangers of industrial machinery by so interpreting this
article of the French Civil Code as to produce a result similar
to that which would have been achieved under the compensation
acts in neighboring countries. The very next year witnessed the
passage of the French Workmen's Compensation Act, and many
of the more conservative French scholars began entertaining the
hope that the Teffaine case could be regarded as a legal anomaly
which merely gave evidence of the need for a compensation
statute, and would now promptly be forgotten.
For nearly twenty years it appeared that this hope would
be fulfilled. The Teffaine case was explained in various ways:
Sometimes it was said that where an injury is occasioned by a
thing which is in the care of the defendant a presumption of
fault is raised by Article 1384, but that this presumption amounts
merely to an inference of negligence, allowing the defendant the
privilege of rebuttal by showing that all due care was used by
him. This would be equivalent to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
as used in England and this country. In fact the French courts
did talk in terms of presumption of fault, rather than presump-
tion of liability.28
The hopes of the more conservative French jurists, that
Article 1384 might be regarded as raising merely an inference of
fault, might have been realized if it had not been for the advent
of the automobile during the first decade of the present century.
The first French cases dealing with traffic accidents applied the
familiar fault principle of Article 1382. It was assumed that the
injury was caused by the act of the driver rather than the act
28. Deak, Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of the Law of
Liability in Europe, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 271, 276-280 (1931). The writer is
indebted to this excellent study for much of the material in the present
paper dealing with French law.
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of the vehicle (the thing), and the victim was required to intro-
duce affirmative evidence of careless driving.
Up until after the first world war all efforts by plaintiffs to
rely upon Article 1384 in traffic cases failed, except in one type
of situation: Where the automobile was unattended at the time
of the accident and the human agency of the defendant was in
no way responsible the court allowed the plainttiff to recover by
showing that his injury was caused by the thing, that is to say,
the automobile. In such a case he did not need to establish fault.
This, however, was regarded as a somewhat exceptional situ-
ation.29
However, many French writers did not overlook the possi-
bility that the ordinary traffic accident could be regarded as the
inevitable result of the presence of motor vehicles on the high-
ways, and hence these accidents by and large should be attributed
to automobiles-things-rather than to the specific acts or defaults
of the drivers. They urged that it should be immaterial whether
the vehicle that inflicted the injury was at the time being oper-
ated by a driver or was unattended. If this argument were
sustained, the result would be that the person having a motor
vehicle in his charge would be absolutely responsible under
Article 1384, irrespective of how carefully he may have been
driving.
But this theory received no sign of recognition by the courts
until 1924. In that year the Court of Cassation handed down a
much controverted decision in the case, Bessi~res v. Abeille Auto
Company.80 The defendant auto company had leased its car to a
person named Saverne. While Saverne was driving he was
obliged to swerve the car violently in order to avoid striking a
bicyclist. This strain broke the steering mechanism of the car,
caused it to leave the highway and crash into the front of a
shop where it injured the plaintiff. The court found as facts
that the steering mechanism was not defective and that the strain
of the sudden swerve was not due to any carelessness on the
part of the driver, Saverne. The trial court refused to apply
Article 1384 because the breaking of the steering wheel could
not be imputed to the machine alone, but was due to the manner
in which the car was being operated. This, as we have already
seen, was the position which had been adopted consistently since
29. Id. at 281-283.
30. Epoux Bessi~res c. Compagnie des Voitures L'Abeille, D.1924.557,
D.1925.I.5.
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the advent of the automobile. On appeal, the Court of Paris held
that Article 1384 did apply, although the court offered no explana-
tion as to why this should be so under established jurisprudence
in a case where the machine was being operated by a person at
the time of the accident. However, the same court found that
the presumption of fault raised by Article 1384 was rebutted by
the showing that the machine was not defective and the further
showing that fault could not be imputed to the owner or the
operator. If this holding had been sustained, the French law of
automobile accidents would probably today be about the same as
it is in England and in the United States, except that the burden
of showing absence of fault would rest upon the defendant. How-
ever, the judgment of the Paris court was set aside by the Court
of Cassation. This tribunal agreed with the Paris court that the
case was properly brought under Article 1384. It disagreed with
the latter court, however, in its holding that a showing of absence
of fault or defect of the vehicle served to rebut the presumption
raised by that article. The Court of Cassation applied the same
rule that had been announced in Teffaine's case twenty-six years
earlier and said that the only defenses available when the injury
is caused by an act of a thing are that the accident was due, not
to the thing, but to an unforeseen event, or to an Act of God.
For six years following this case the French law of automo-
bile accidents was in a state of hopeless confusion, due princi-
pally to the fact that the decision was susceptible of several
diverse interpretations. One group of jurists insisted that the
court intended to apply Article 1384 to vehicles which were being
driven at the time of the accident only if some defect in the
machinery, even though hidden, caused the accident. Others
insisted that all auto accidents fall within Article 1384 and that
the court intended to impose virtually absolute liability on the
driver and owner. This sharp diversity of opinion was reflected
in all decisions of lower courts during this period, and the law
was completely unsettled for six years on the most prolific source
of litigation in France.31
Confusion became so rampant that a final solution of the
problem was required in the form of a test case before all the
several chambers of the Court of Cassation sitting en banc. This
came in 1930.32 The accident that gave rise to this famous piece
31. See Note by Ripert to Jand'heur c. Les Galeries Belfortaises, Cass.
Liv., 21 Fev. 1927, D.1927.97.
32. Jand'heur c. Les Galeries Belfortaises, D.1930.129, D.1930.I.57. The
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of litigation was of the common variety of traffic accidents. It
was chosen deliberately as a cause cdl~bre because of its typi-
cality. The truck of the defendant, a department store, operated
by its employee, ran over and injured Lise Jand'heur, a little
girl. A suit based on Article 1384 was brought on her behalf by
her father. Both the trial court and the intermediate court of
appeal held that Article 1384 has no application where the vehicle
is being operated by a human agency and that in such a case the
injury must be attributed to the act of the driver, not the vehicle.
Hence Jand'heur should have brought his suit under Article 1382
and should have established affirmatively the negligence of the
driver.
When appeal was taken before the Court of Cassation the
entire matter was debated at great length, and all the conflicting
cases and the divergent opinions of the commentators were pre-
sented to the court. The opinion was an unusually lengthy one
and it filled eighteen pages of the printed reports. The court first
reaffirmed the proposition that where suit is properly instituted
under Article 1384 the defendant cannot excuse himself by show-
ing his freedom from negligence. The opinion then was directed
toward the disputed question of whether the article applies
where the vehicle was being operated by a driver and the acci-
dent was not due to any defect of the machine, such as faulty
brakes or steering wheel. The court concluded in unmistakable
language that the car-the thing-is as much under the care of
the operator when it is being driven as when it is standing still
unattended, and that the accident is due to the act of the machine
at such a time even though the act of the machine is in turn
attributable to the conduct of the driver. Therefore, the conduct
of the driver, whether careful or careless, can be ignored, and
absolute liability imposed under the article in question.
This monumental Jand'heur decision, then, made clear be-
yond any doubt that the driver of a car is absolutely liable for
all hurts inflicted through the operation of his vehicle. The
decision has been accepted and applied without dissent in all
French traffic cases since 1930. The term "fault" or "presump-
tion of fault" has disappeared in decisions interpreting Article
case had been decided previously by the Chambre Civil, but the court of
appeal (Lyon) refused to follow the decision (Lyon 7, July 1927, D.1927.423),
whereupon the present decision was rendered upon a pourvoi in cassation.
The decision is reprinted in full (French) in Lawson, Negligence in the Civil
Law 249-268 (1950). A condensed version in English will be found in Von
Mehren, The Civil Law System 153 (unpublished mimeograph 1950).
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1384, and the courts now speak of a "presumption of responsi-
bility" which can be rebutted only in the rare cases where an
Act of God or an unforeseen event is established as the sole
cause of the accident.
Corollary doctrines have been modified so as to comport with
the new interpretation of Article 1384. Where two vehicles collide
and both are injured it has been argued that the mutual liability
of each driver to the other which would follow under an applica-
tion of this article should operate so as to effect a cancelling out,
and that Article 1382, with its fault basis, should control. This
argument, however, was rejected in another famous case in 1941
before the Court of Cassation.33 The court held that each is
responsible in full under Article 1384 for the harm done the
other. A similar modification has taken place with reference to
the established French doctrine of faute commune or comparative
negligence. It is a matter of common knowledge that where suit
is instituted under the "fault" article, 1382, the contributing fault
or carelessness of the victim does not entirely preclude his recov-
ery, but his own negligence is considered merely in mitigation
of damages.3 4 The same rule prevails in England3 5 and also in
this country under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and in
a few American jurisdictions, such as Mississippi and Wiscon-
sin.3 6 What effect is to be given the victim's fault where suit is
instituted under Article 1384? Counsel for defendant have argued
that where the victim caused the accident by his own careless-
ness, the mishap should not be regarded as having been caused
by the defendant's vehicle-the thing-and that that article
should not apply. But this argument has not met with favor in
the courts. They have adopted the position that in the average
traffic accident case both the motion of the vehicle and the con-
duct of the victim combine to produce the accident. Therefore
the defendant in charge of the vehicle is still liable without refer-
33. Dame Veuve Delcayre c. Messal, D.1933.I.57 (March 20, 1933). Lawson
observes that this decision, although logically indefensible, can be justified
under the observation that liability insurance is more prevalent than insur-
ance against collision. Hence under the rule of Delcayre's case the whole
of the loss Is more likely to fall upon insurance companies than if the con-
trary position had been adopted. Lawson, Negligence in the Civil Law 58
(1950).
34. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Chi-Kent Rev. 189,
239 (1950).
35. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. VI,
c. 28. Discussed in Williams, The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence
Act of 1945), 9 Mod. L. Rev. 105 (1946).
36. Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions 56-67
(1936).
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ence to his fault, and the carelessness of the victim serves only
to mitigate the amount to be recovered. 7 In so holding, the
courts are, in effect, comparing plaintiff's negligence with defen-
dant's absolute liability. This process is more appropriately
called "comparative causation," rather than comparative negli-
gence.
It is clear, then, that a gradual process of manipulation of
doctrine by the French courts has brought about the astounding
result that owners and operators of motor vehicles must pay for
the hurts and damage inflicted by such vehicles irrespective of
whether the driver or owner was or was not at fault. The pre-
vailing principle is the same as in workmen's compensation. It
is a recognition of the fact that the presence of motor vehicles on
the highways creates a peril for all persons who are exposed to
their operation, and that those who get the benefit of such vehicles
must be prepared to pay the accident cost which is necessarily
involved, just as the consumer or user of goods or services pro-
duced by industry must bear the inevitable risk of accident that
follows in the wake of industrial operations.
Such a principle cannot, of course, operate without terrific
hardship on the motoring public unless the medium of liability
insurance is available to absorb and distribute the cost of this
risk upon all drivers and car owners. At the time of the devel-
opment of the new interpretation of Article 1384 automobile
liability insurance was not compulsory in France. It has been
estimated, however, that by 1938 ninety-five per cent of all
French automobilists were voluntarily insured.8 The present
Commission for the Revision of the French Civil Code is consid-
ering compulsory liability insurance for all automobilists, coupled
with an arrangement for an unsatisfied judgment fund.8 9
In comparing the present French law of auto accidents and
the familiar principle of workmen's compensation, it is note-
worthy that the French rule goes far beyond the usual employer's
liability act in two important respects: first, the person in charge
of the vehicle is responsible without reference to fault for the
full damages which were suffered by the victim both with
37. Veuve Abela c. Laiterie cooperative de Saint-Andr6-de-l'Eure, 27 Oct.
1948, S.1949.I.119.
38. Report of Professor Besson, Travaux de la Commission de R~forme
du Code Civil 353 (1947-1948).
39. Assurance Obligatoire pour les Dommages Causes aux Tiers par les
Vehicules Automobiles, Travaux de la Commission de R~forme du Code
Civil c. 2 (1947-1948).
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respect to his person and to his property. The defendant is not
entitled to the benefit of the very modest compensation schedule
provided in the typical compensation act. Second, it is note-
worthy that the French liability for the acts of things is not
restricted to the acts of automobiles or other dangerous pieces
of industrial machinery. The new interpretation of Article 1384
is not limited to situations in which there is an apparent justi-
fication for institutionalizing the risk of accident, as in work-
men's compensation. The article is as easily applied in theory to
a Seltzer bottle, a chair, a ladder, or any other apparently harm-
less object which on some occasion happens to inflict injury
either while standing alone or while in the hands of its possessor,
who may be either an industrialist or a simple domestic user.
The ramifications of' this strange new interpretation of Article
1384 have not yet been fully explored by either the courts or
writers, but it is obvious that the implications are many and
are of far-reaching effect. No other system of law has gone
so far.
40
It is obvious to the common law lawyer that the law of
France has been transformed through a painful process of law-
making by the courts in the face of legislative indifference. The
process shows readily through the thin disguising veil of "inter-
pretation." The path of the development discussed above is
strewn with leading cases such as have always marked the
evolution of the common law. Judicial ingenuity, the constant
reinterpretation of old precedents, and the drawing of distinc-
tions between cases make this chapter of French jurisprudence
a study of a technique with which students of the common law
are more familiar than are civilians.
Other countries whose codes are modeled after the French
have generally refused to follow unreservedly the newer French
interpretation of Article 1384. Reluctance to follow the lead of
the French courts is manifest in Spain, Quebec, Belgium, Egypt,
and other countries which have code provisions similar to the
40. Capitant, D. H. Chronique 29-32 (1930).
"In order to apply Article 1382 it would be necessary to assume a collision
between two nudists. Even here there may be some jurist who would say
that the body is a thing under the care (garde) of the will, and as a result
we must apply Article 1384 in every case of a corporal act by man!"
Ripert, Note to L'Affaire Jand'heur, D.P. 1930.1.57. (This freely translated
statement is extracted from its context and should not be accepted literally
as expressing the considered point of view of the learned jurist, Ripert. It
does, however, epitomize the concern being manifested by French scholars
over the possible implications of the new jurisprudence.)
1952]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
French Article 1384. Some of these countries, however, have
enacted special laws relative to automobile accident liability.41
It is now profitable to deal briefly with the law of a few
foreign countries which have enacted express statutory provisions
dealing with specific dangers of the machine age and which have
abolished for these fields the requirement of fault either in
whole or in part.
GERMAN STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR TRAFFIC AND
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS
German law, like that of France, starts with the general
assumption that fault of the defendant is an indispensable pre-
requisite to recovery in a tort action.42 However, Germany has
led the continent of Europe in forthright legislative change to
meet the challenge of the hazardous machine-age. It is familiar
knowledge that the Germany of Bismarck initiated the now
universal workmen's compensation movement, and that by the
nriiddle of the 1880's the German employer was made absolutely
liable for all injuries to his employees. It is not so widely known,
however, that the evolution of workmen's compensation was a
comparatively late step in the German progress toward absolute
liability for the peculiar dangers of industry and traffic. As far
back as 1838 a German statute, which, with certain modifications
in 1871, still prevails today, imposed absolute liability upon all
railroads for all personal injuries and deaths inflicted through
the operation of trains.43 The operator was permitted to show
that the injury was due to an Act of God.44 The same statute
provides that the absolute liability which it imposes does
not exist where the accident was due to the fault of the
victim himself. Here, 'however, the courts have adopted an
interpretation that has deprived this provision of its original
meaning. Germany, like France, has the principle of compara-
tive negligence, whereby the fault of the victim is considered
only a matter in mitigation of damages. The German courts have
41. Premier Congress International de L'association Henri Capitant pour
la Culture Juridique Frangaise 471 (Quebec), 503 (Egypt), 555 (Japan), 565
(Morocco), 579 (Netherlands) (Montreal 1939).
42. 2 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Burgerlichen Gesetzbuches Amtliche
Ausgabe (1888) II, pp. 727-728; V. B. w. St., 95 R.G.Z. 268, 271 (Reg. iv. z. 5,
Dec. 12, 1918). See also German Civil Code § 823 (1896); 2 Arminjon, Nolde,
Wolff, Droit Compar6 § 530 (1950).
43. Reichshaftplichtgesetz, vorn 7. Juni 1871, discussed in Enneccerus,
Kipp, Wolff, Lehrbuch des Burgerlichen Rechts, v. II, § 245 (1927).
44. Reichshaftplichtgesetz, op. cit. supra note 43, at § 1; Enneccerus,
Kipp, Wolff, op. cit. supra note 43, at § 245, 1.4.
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brought this principle into action in railway cases under the
statute we are discussing where the defendant railroad was
morally blameless and the victim was careless to some extent. 4
Accordingly the victim of a railroad accident recovers in any
event, but receives a reduced amount if he was guilty of con-
tributory negligence himself. Here again, as in France, we have
the notion of comparative causation, as opposed to comparative
negligence.
In 1909, when the automobile was still a sputtering toy,
the legislature of Germany adopted a somewhat similar measure
with reference to the liability of the owner and driver.46 Here,
however, the statute was less extreme than the Railway Liability
Act. First, it relieved the victim of an automobile accident of
the necessity of affirmatively establishing negligence in order
to establish a prima facie case. Furthermore, if the injury or
death was due'to a defect in the car or its mechanical operation,
the defendant was not permitted to exonerate himself by showing
that he was ignorant of the danger or even that he had made all
requisite inspections of the vehicle.47 If, however, the defendant
could convince the court that the vehicle itself was in satisfac-
tory condition, he was permitted to resist the claim by establish-
ing the fact that the car was being operated with all the care
required by the circumstances. 48 In this respect the German law
is not as exacting as we have found it to be in France. It is
also noteworthy that the German Automobile Act does not apply
to vehicles which are incapable of moving at a tolerably rapid
speed. 49 Furthermore, the damages recoverable are arbitrarily
limited in the act.50
SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
At this point it may be recalled that Jeremiah Smith pre-
dicted that the breakdown of fault would probably begin with
a shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant. 51 That is to
say, he would be required to exonerate himself from blame. This
prediction has been fulfilled completely in nearly every country
45. Ibid.
46. Gesetz uber den Verkehr mit Kraftfahrzugen, Reichgesetzblatt, 437
(1909).
47. Enneccerus, Kipp, Wolff, op. cit. supra note 43, at § 246, 1.5(b).
48. Id. at § 246, 1.5 (a). See also the rather cumbersome terminology of
Section 7 of the statute (supra note 46).
49. Reichgesetzblatt 437 (1909).
50. Enneccerus, Kipp, Wolff, op. cit. supra note 43, at § 246, III.
51. P. 234, supra.
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outside the United States and England. Irrespective of how the
various foreign statutes may differ otherwise, they share this
common characteristic-the burden of proof no longer rests on
the victim. Outstanding examples are the statutes of Italy 52 and
Switzerland. 53 Although the general tort law of these countries
proceeds on the usual premise that the plaintiff must allege and
affirmatively prove the fault or negligence of the defendant, yet
special statutory provisions relieve the victim of an automobile
accident of this necessity. This type of statute is becoming
increasingly familiar on the North American continent. If one
does no more than drive from Detroit across to Windsor, Ontario,
he will find that the burden of proof has been shifted from the
victim to the driver by express statutory provision in all cases
except where two vehicles collide and mutual injury is suffered,
or where the victim is a guest in defendant's vehicle.54 Lawyers
who, in this country, are tempted to complain when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is applied to a rear end collision or to a
vehicle that leaves the highway and inflicts injury may do well
to pause and recall that these exceptional situations constitute
the general rule for all auto accidents in most countries outside
our own.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY IN
OTHER COUNTRIES
We may now turn to the second aspect of Professor Smith's
prediction. It will be recalled that he stated that once the burden
of proof had been placed upon the shoulders of the driver or
owner of the vehicle, the task of discharging this burden would
be made increasingly difficult until finally it would become
impossible for the defendant to exonerate himself from liability.
It is this latter aspect of Smith's prediction which seems to be
in the process of fulfillment in countries outside the Anglo-
American legal sphere. The differences between the various pro-
visions are considerable, but in practically every country the
burden of exoneration is becoming increasingly difficult in one
way or another.
We have seen that in France proof of absence of fault on
the part of the driver or owner is almost completely unavailing.
52. Italian Civil Code, Art. 2054 (1942); 2 Arminjon, Nolde, Wolff, Droit
Compar6 65, § 375 (1950).
53. Swiss Motor Law (Loi Federale Sur la Circulation des Vehicules Auto-
mobiles et des Cycles) 15 mars 1932.
54. Ontario Highway Traffic Act, Ontario Rev. Stats. 1937, c. 288, § 48.
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In Germany, attempts to prove absence of fault in connection
with the condition of the vehicle are equally ineffective, although
a showing of due care with reference to driving itself affords a
defense. In neither of these countries can the defendant avail
himself of the contributory negligence of the victim as a defense,
although this may be shown in mitigation of damages.
When we turn to the law of other nations we find similar
differences. In some countries the defendant is virtually an
insurer, as he is in France. Article 1913 of the Civil Code of
Mexico, provides in substance that a person who makes use of
machines, instruments or substances which are dangerous either
in themselves or by reason of the velocity which they develop,
is liable for the damage caused, although he did not act "illegally"
(that is, wrongfully or negligently). He is, however, permitted
to set up as a defense the gross fault of the victim.
This Mexican provision, which at first seems striking, is in
effect similar to the familiar English principle of Rylands v.
Fletcher, extended in two respects. The Mexican provision covers
injuries to the person, while Rylands v. Fletcher is usually, al-
though not always; limited to injuries to land. Second, Rylands
v. Fletcher has been restricted by the English courts to activities
which are unusual and which involve hazards beyond those
normally expected in life.55 Hence, that doctrine does not em-
brace injuries inflicted by motor vehicles in traffic, since auto-
mobiles are not regarded as offering unusual perils. The Mexi-
can provision, of course, does apply to automobile: accidents.
It is safe to assume that the Mexican Article 1913 was not
inspired by the doctrine of the Jand'heur decision, since that
decision came in 1930, two years after the enactment of the Mexi-
can Code of 1928.
The Mexican provision is strikingly similar to the method
of attack adopted in the Soviet Russian Code of 1923. It will be
recalled that the present Mexican Code marks the culmination
of revolutionary activities and the increasing socialization of the
Mexican Republic, and a borrowing from Soviet law is fairly
to be expected.
For this reason, a brief excursion into the Soviet law relat-
ing to personal injuries may be of interest. One would be inclined
at the outset to assume that the requirement of fault as a condi-
55. A.L.I., Restatement, Torts, § 520(b) (1938).
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tion to liability would be entirely alien to communist ideals.
The notion that one should be held only for his own blameworthy
conduct and that in the absence of negligence the risk of accident
should lie where it falls, reflects an individualistic attitude that
is more characteristic of the philosophy of capitalism than of the
completely socialistic state where distribution of wealth accord-
ing to need is the prevailing philosophy. However, the accident
law of the Soviet does not entirely confirm this assumption. The
matter of accidental injury is controlled by two provisions of the
Soviet Civil Code, Articles 403 and 404. The first of these, Article
403, is not unlike the typical codal provision found elsewhere on
the continent.56 Liability is made dependent upon the existence
of fault, at least in the sense that the defendant can excuse him-
self by showing that all due care was used. Although Soviet
writers complained at first that this requirement of fault reflects
bourgeois ideas,57 it nevertheless has persisted and now controls
the bulk of Soviet tort litigation outside the field of industrial
and traffic injuries.58
The second provision, Article 404, provides in substance that
individuals or enterprises whose activities involve increased
hazards for persons coming into contact with them, including
railroads, tramways and industries, shall be absolutely liable for
the harms that are inflicted.5 9 The only defenses in the case of
such ultra-hazardous activities are Acts of God or the gross con-
tributory negligence of the victim. This Article 404 has been
interpreted by the Soviet courts to cover injuries inflicted
through the operation of motor vehicles.60
From this it is apparent that the approach in Mexico and
in Soviet Russia is the same. In both nations the ordinary dan-
56. Soviet Civil Code § 403 (1923): "Anyone causing injury to the person
or property of another must repair the injury caused. He is relieved from
liability, if he proves that he could not prevent the injury, or that he was
privileged to cause the injury, or that the injury arose as a result of the
intent or gross negligence of the person injured."
57. 1 Gsovsky, Soviet Civil Law 496 (Mich. Legal Studies, 1948).
58. Id. at 500.
59. Soviet Civil Code § 404 (1923): "Individuals and enterprises whose
activities involve increased hazard for persons coming into contact with them,
such as railways, tramways, industrial establishments, dealers in inflam-
mable materials, keepers of wild animals, persons erecting buildings and
other structures, and the like, shall be liable for the injury caused by the
source of increased hazard, if they do not prove that the injury was the
result of force majeure or occurred through the intent or gross negligence
of the person injured."
60. Gsovsky, op. cit. supra note 57, at 504-510; Holman and Spinner,
Basis of Liability for Tortious Injury In Soviet Law, 22 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 13-21
(1936).
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gers of non-mechanized living are treated differently from the
special hazards that arise in industry and transportation. How-
ever, in any consideration of Soviet tort law we must bear in
mind that damages recoverable under the Soviet articles serve
only to supplement the benefits payable to the victims under the
very complicated system of social insurance that prevails in
Russia and which covers accident loss from all sources. This
social insurance does not compensate the victim to the full extent
of his lost earnings, and the damages which he may recover in
a tort action are generally limited to an amount sufficient to fill
in this gap.61 This suggests that if the benefits of the social
insurance system were enlarged so as to afford full coverage,
there would be no further need for a tort law to cover personal
injuries in Soviet Russia. As a matter of fact, the impact of an
extensive social insurance system upon private tort liability is
becoming a problem of increasing complexity in England, where
such a system also prevails.6 2 Finland, Norway and Denmark
have statutes imposing liability without reference to fault for
injuries caused by motor vehicles.6 3
It is obvious that fault, or negligence, is playing an increas-
ingly insignificant role in the determination of automobile acci-
dent disputes. In the commentaries of foreign writers the same
story appears and reappears, namely, that modem traffic and
transportation is the source of increased perils to the safety of
human beings, and that the activity itself, whether it is the
operation of locomotives or busses or even the driving of a pri-
vate car, should pay for the increased number of hurts and deaths
which the activity has brought about.
. This, of course, is an aspect of the law of workmen's com-
pensation-the substitution of the notion of inevitable and indige-
nous risk in place of the older idea of moral blameworthiness.
But the modern idea of workmen's compensation goes further
than this. It embraces additional features. The most important
is the fact that workmen's compensation substitutes the idea of
modified scheduled losses in place of the broad concept of tort
damages. It is felt that if the employee victim is to enjoy a
recovery from his employer for every hurt he experiences in the
61. Hazard, Personal Injury and Soviet Socialism, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 545
(1952).
62. Friedmann, Social Insurance and the Principle of Tort Liability, 63
Harv. L. Rev. 241 (1949).
63. Deak, Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of the Law of
Liability in Europe, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 271, 301 (1931).
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course of his employment, it is fair that the amount which he
recovers should be somewhat limited. In workmen's compensa-
tion damages for pain and suffering go out the window, and,
further, the employee must be satisfied to accept a limited
indemnity which will replace only a part of his lost earning
power. This aspect of compensation-the part which is most
favorable to the defendant-has not as yet been recognized in
the countries discussed where the requirement of fault has dis-
appeared or is disappearing in transportation litigation.
The Frenchman who recovers under Article 1384 without
being required to establish the carelessness of the driver whose
car struck him will recover damages as complete in every respect
as the American victim of an auto accident in Chicago who spent
hours on the witness stand in an effort to convince the jury that
the defendant was negligent. The nearest approach to the lim-
ited recovery which is characteristic of workmen's compensation
will be found in the German statute referred to earlier which
imposed absolute liability upon railroads. That statute prescribes
a maximum sum which can be recovered under its provisions,
but this is hardly comparable to a typical compensation schedule.
THE SASKATCHEWAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ACT
Strangely enough, if we wish to see the principle of work-
men's compensation applied in its entirety to automobile acci-
dents of every description we must turn, not to some of the more
daring European nations, but to a remote province in Canada-
the Province of Saskatchewan. It is here that Jeremiah Smith's
prediction has been fulfilled in every minutia. Here in Saskatche-
wan is the proving ground for a method of handling traffic acci-
dents that bears little resemblance to any other system on earth.
A radical experiment in motor vehicle liability of the type
under consideration was possible in Saskatchewan without too
much risk either in terms of benefit or of cost to the motorist
because of the few number of vehicles in the province and the
absence of extreme congestion on any of its highways. In 1948-
the latest year on which reliable figures are available-there were
only about 167,000 vehicles registered. At that time there were
more 1929 model cars and trucks than any other on the Saskatche-
wan roads. During the winter months of extremely cold weather
motor traffic grinds to a virtual halt outside the larger centers.
For example, during the three months period from January
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through March 1950 there were only about three hundred acci-
dents involving personal injuries.
The urge to experiment in the automobile accident field can
be attributed to the rather unusual political party known as the
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation which has been in power
in Saskatchewan since 1944. This party represents a coalition
between the advocates of an agrarian movement and certain
labor groups supporting socialist principles. The party advocates
government ownership of public transportation and public utili-
ties, and also, insurance.
In 1945 the government appointed a committee to study the
problem of compensation for automobile accidents. The Sas-
katchewan committee concluded that liability based upon fault
or negligence offers an entirely inadequate solution for traffic
accident problems.04
The various arguments which have been advanced in sup-
port of the abolition of negligence or fault follow a standard
pattern. It is frequently urged that the type of conduct which is
commonly characterized as negligence by the law, such as heed-
lessness or lack of capacity to respond quickly to emergency
situations, is typical of automobile driving in general, and no
valid objective can be gained by specially penalizing the driver
who happens to manifest this common shortcoming at a time
when it results in injury.
Negligence in traffic has long ceased to be regarded as con-
duct which is morally condemned by society. Often it is nothing
more than a violation of some arbitrary traffic regulation which
has little moral significance. We cannot hope that by imposing
liability for these shortcomings we will encourage drivers to be
more careful. Neither can we maintain with frankness that it is
fair to hold the negligent driver in expiation for his sins.
It has been pointed out that the effort to determine who
was at fault in a typical automobile accident is largely a matter
of guesswork engaged in by judge and jury after listening to
unreliable testimony of witnesses whose attention at the moment
of accident was probably not close, whose estimate of speed
and distance are notoriously inaccurate, whose memory of what
they did see is not dependable, and whose statements are often
in hopeless conflict with each other.
64. Report on the Study of Compensation for Victims of Automobile
Accidents (1947).
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The practice of attempting to fix liability in terms of who
was to blame is 'wasteful and is productive of no benefit to society
which can offset the disadvantages of delay, expense, and the
capricious character of the outcome, all of which follow in the
wake of the use of the fault or negligence concept. So run the
arguments of those who advocate liability without reference to
fault in traffic cases.
A second conclusion of the Saskatchewan committee relates
to the inadequacy of existing financial responsibility laws and
voluntary liability insurance, including even such recent inno-
vations as assigned risk plans, and unsatisfied judgment funds.
The committee strongly advocated compulsory insurance as a
state undertaking which would permit the underwriter to impose
premium surcharges when deemed advisable. This compulsory
insurance should be integrated with the registration of vehicles
in an effort to keep unqualified drivers off the road.
This report led to the passage of the Saskatchewan Auto-
mobile Accident Insurance Act of 1946, which, with certain
amendments in 1947, 1948, and 1949, is the controlling law of the
province today.65 This act contains fifty-seven major sections
with almost innumerable subsections and schedules. Only a
brief survey of the more vital provisions of the measure is pos-
sible here.
Every car owner in Saskatchewan is required to register his
vehicle in order to drive lawfully upon the highways of the
province. As a condition to the registration of his vehicle he is
required to show that he has paid his premium and is duly
insured under the Accident Insurance Act.66 No policy is issued
to him, but he receives instead a certificate of compliance. The
terms of the insurance are all prescribed in the act itself. The
portion with which we are presently concerned designates as
beneficiaries all persons who suffer loss resulting from bodily
injuries sustained through accidental means as a result of driv-
ing, riding in or upon, or operating a moving motor vehicle, or
65. Saskatchewan Stats, 1946, c. 11; Saskatchewan Stats. 1947, c. 15;
Saskatchewan Stats. 1948, c. 15; Saskatchewan Stats. 1949, c. 11. The entire
act is reprinted In Report on Automobile Liability Insurance by Legislative
Research Committee of North Dakota 174-243 (1950):
An excellent summary of the act appears in 31 J. Comp. Leg. & Int'l
L. 39 (3 ser. 1949). See also Grad, Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 Col.
L. Rev. 300, 320 (1950).
The Saskatchewan statutes, as amended above, will be referred to here-
after as the Automobile Accident Insurance Act, 1947.
66. Automobile Accident Insurance Act, 1947, note 65, supra, at § 3(1).
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as a result of a collision with or being struck, run down or run
over by a moving motor vehicle.67 This includes the driver him-
self, all occupants of the vehicle and also third persons who are
injured through its operation.
The important feature of the act, of course, is that the insur-
ance does not merely cover injuries for which the certificate
holder would be held liable for damages in an action at law. It
creates a claim in favor of anyone who is injured by a moving
registered and insured vehicle, irrespective of how carefully it
may have been driven. The claim is not to be asserted against
the driver or the certificate holder, but against the state insur-
ance fund. Insofar as this portion of the act is concerned, it
neither creates an action for damages against the driver or owner,
nor does it affect any cause of action which otherwise might be
maintained against him. In short, it is state insurance, payable
from a fund made up of premiums charged against all owners of
registered vehicles. It differs basically in only one respect from
the English social insurance system which also affords accident
compensation coverage: under, the Saskatchewan Act the pro-
tection is paid for by those who make use of motor vehicles,
rather than by the taxpayer at large.
The Saskatchewan scheme falls squarely within the principle
of workmen's compensation because the risk creating enterprise
(which under workmen's compensation is the industry, and
under the Saskatchewan act is the operation of motor vehicles
for any purpose)-this enterprise is required to support the
accident cost that experience has shown flows from it. Again,
as in workmen's compensation, the risk is spread through the
medium of insurance. There is little difference, except in form,
whether the claim is asserted against the insured owner of the
car or directly against the insurer as under the Saskatchewan
act. In either event, the liability has become entirely impersonal
and it is paid from a common fund supported by premiums from
all who benefit from the enterprise of operating motor vehicles.
In view of the fact that the victim makes his claim for an
insurance benefit, rather than damages, it was easy to limit the
amount and duration of the benefit by a schedule in the act. In
this respect the Saskatchewan legislature has followed the gen-
eral model of the typical compensation statute. Benefits fall
into four established groups: weekly indemnity for loss of in-
67. Id. at § 16(1).
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come, supplementary allowances in connection with this indem-
nity, arbitrary lump sum payments for a loss of eye or limb,
and death benefits. The provisions are in general much more
modest than the corresponding provisions of a modem compensa-
tion act.
The determination of loss of income with reference to the
population at large will obviously offer more administrative diffi-
culties than a corresponding determination of loss of wage which
must be made under the average workmen's compensation act.
The victim may be a professional man, an enterpriser, a house-
wife, or perhaps an unemployed person. However, the fact that
the maximum weekly payment allowed under the act is only
twenty dollars 8 minimizes the difficulty of ascertaining what
the earnings were for the preceding year, which is the basis
adopted under the Saskatchewan act.
Special provisions also afford some assistance. For instance,
in the case of an injured farmer, who may lose his entire crop if
he were involved in an accident at harvest time, or who had suf-
fered crop loss the previous year by reason of drought, hail, or
insects, it is manifestly unfair to compute his loss in terms of
actual cash earnings of the previous year. In order to compensate
for this, and also to relieve the administrative burden, the act
establishes a conclusive presumption that the farmer's past yearly
earnings were at the maximum recognized by the act, namely,
twenty dollars.6 9
The injured housewife presents a unique problem for a com-
pensation schedule of this kind. She is not a wage earner in the
commonly accepted sense; yet if she is disabled by accident,
her entire household suffers. Her case receives arbitrary treat-
ment under the Saskatchewan act. She is entitled to twelve
dollars and fifty cents a week for a period of six consecutive
weeks if she is totally disabled. This is to assist the household
in procuring substitute services during the initial period follow-
ing the accident.7 0
If a claimant is totally and continuously disabled he is
entitled to wage indemnity, determined and limited as above, for
a period of fifty-two weeks.7 ' If he is only partially disabled, the
compensation is graded downward according to the formula
68. Id. at § 18(1).
69. Id. at § 18(4).
70. Id. at § 18(3); Id. at § 2, para. 11.
71. Id. at § 18(1)1.
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familiar to us under the Workmen's Compensation Statute in
terms of the difference between earnings before and after the
accident. 72 In the case of the totally disabled person, compensa-
tion may continue after the fifty-two week period until the claim-
ant has received a total of twenty-four hundred dollars.7 3 No
such additional allowance is provided for the victim who is only
partially disabled. It is noteworth, that the indemnity equals
the whole amount of the lost weekly wage, instead of an arbi-
trary sixty-six and two-thirds per cent as found in the average
workmen's compensation statute. It was felt that the arbitrary
limit of twenty dollars weekly, and the shortness of the period
during which compensation is payable, makes any further limita-
tion unnecessary.
The supplementary allowance to which I have referred is
for the purpose of defraying at least in part medical expenses
involved following the accident. The amount of this allowance
is determined at the absolute discretion of the insurer, except
that the maximum is established by a schedule in the act, which
lists designated injuries and medical services and prescribes the
maximum allowable in each instance in much the same manner
as in the ordinary hospital insurance policy with which we are
all familiar.7 4 Two hundred and twenty-five dollars is the high-
est amount set in any instance.
Lump sum benefits for loss of eye or limb are entirely supple-
mental to any other benefit to which the claimant may be en-
titled.7 5 The most serious loss listed is that of both eyes, for which
two thousand dollars is allowable.
Death benefits are distributed according to a scheme similar
to those provided under workmen's compensation acts. It is
sufficient to say here that a widow receives three thousand dol-
lars, and the same is true of an orphaned child where there is no
widow. Where there is more than one dependent, the allowance
is increased by six hundred and twenty-five dollars for each
such additional dependent until a maximum of seven thousand
dollars has been reached.7 6
Here, then, is the compensation scheme in full application
to ordinary traffic accidents with fault eliminated and a schedule
72. Id. at § 18(1); id. at § 18(2).
73. Id. at § 18(1)2.
74. Id. at § 19(1) and Schedule A.
75. Id. at § 17(3).
76. Id. at § 20.
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provided which follows that of workmen's compensation on a
slightly more conservative basis. The driver's or owner's tort
liability is left untouched. The application of the act does not
exclude the victim's remedy for damages for negligence. In
this respect the model of workmen's compensation is not fol-
lowed. A certain measure of relief, however, is afforded the
defendant. The act provides that where a judgment for dam-
ages is secured against a registered owner or driver, there shall
be deducted the amount to which the victim may be entitled
under the compensation provision of the statute.77 This repre-
sents the same general type of adjustment between social insur-
ance and tort damages which was mentioned earlier in connection
with the law of Soviet Russia. 78 Since the Saskatchewan motorist
can be subjected to a damage claim for personal injuries or dam-
aged property despite the compensation scheme, the state has
seen fit to require that he insure against this liability also, and
this insurance is likewise carried with the Government Insurance
Office.70 Like the required premium for the compensation insur-
ance the payment for this liability insurance is a necessary con-
dition to the securing of a registration certificate for the vehicle.
Under the compulsory liability policy claims for personal injury
are limited to five and ten thousand dollars, while property dam-
age is limited to one thousand dollars, with a one hundred dollar
deductible provision. This latter feature is unusual in liability
insurance.
One may feel that this is quite enough compulsory insurance
to impose upon the owner of a registered vehicle even in an area
where the strong arm of the government can compel insurance
coverage. However, the Saskatchewan government has not
stopped here. It is observed that damage to an owner's vehicle
is not recoverable under the compensation feature of the act,
which is limited to personal injury. Neither is such damage cov-
ered under the liability policy unless the driver was at fault.
Furthermore, where no negligence can be shown, the compensa-
tion liability for personal injuries is severely limited by the
schedule. Thus, there is a need for ordinary collision insurance,
as we know it in this country. Perhaps the need is even greater
in Saskatchewan, because the province is almost entirely agri-
77. Id. at § 48. Special provision is made for the situation where the oper-
ator was not authorized to operate a motor vehicle. Id. at § 49.
78. P. 253, supra.
79. Automobile Accident Insurance Act, Note 65, supra, at Part Ila.
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cultural and motor vehicles have become indispensable pieces of
farm equipment. Extensive damage to a farm truck could pro-
duce disaster for a farm family whose income is as low as that
which prevails in the province. Thus, added to the compulsory
and the liability insurance is compulsory collision, fire and theft
coverage, all of which are subject to a one hundred dollar deduct-
ible provision.80
The procurement of all this insurance is required of the
vehicle owner, and it is paid for by him for the privilege of taking
his car or truck onto the highway. The premium cost for this
combination of compensation insurance-liability insurance, and
insurance against collision, fire and theft-is fixed in terms of
the age of the vehicle to be registered, and the insurance fund
is supplemented by the imposition of a license fee of one dollar
for each driver. It is surprising to note that the single registra-
tion premiums for all combined coverages for a private vehicle
ranges from four dollars fifty cents to ten dollars per year,
depending on the age of the vehicle.8' The average premium is
about seven dollars.
It is difficult to compare this extremely low rate with the
prevailing rates for similar insurance in this country. First, the
rate is affected by the fact that we are dealing with social insur-
ance operated by the government. This greatly affects the cost.
Not only is the profit element eliminated, but operating costs
are materially reduced by reason of the fact that advertising and
solicitation is unnecessary. The premium is collected on or before
March 31st of each year at the time the vehicle is registered and
the insurance remains in force during the period of the effective
registration. The issuance of a formal policy is unnecessary under
the scheme. In 1949 the ratio of expenses incurred to premiums
written was only slightly over eighteen per cent.82 This may
be compared with the average fifty per cent loading factor char-
acteristic of private insurance in the same field in this country.
The social insurance character of the Saskatchewan act has
affected the premium on private vehicles in other important
80. Id. at Part III.
81. These figures are based upon a study by Arthur L. Bailey, Chief
Actuary of the Insurance Department of the State of New York, made on
behalf of the Legislative Research Committee of North Dakota, and are set
forth in the Report on Automobile Liability Insurance of that group (pub-
lished by State of North Dakota, 1950). See also Grad, Automobile Accident
Compensation, 50 Col. L. Rev. 300, 323 (1950).
82. Report on Automobile Liability Insurance, by Legislative Research
Committee of North Dakota 56 (1950).
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respects. First, there is a substantial differential between the
low premium for private vehicles and the premium for indus-
trial and commercial cars and trucks. The differential may seem
strange at first blush, but under a social insurance plan govern-
ment feels it is entitled to assume that the increased premium
for commercial enterprises will be passed along the channels of
trade in the form of an increased charge to the ultimate con-
sumer or user. Therefore, the higher rates for commercial vehicles
are regarded in Saskatchewan as socially justifiable. This, again,
is nothing more than a natural corollary of the workmen's com-
pensation principle when applied to a new field.
Second, the premium rates for private vehicles are the same
for both rural and city owners, despite the differences in accident
experience. This, of course, would not be possible under private
competitive insurance. The net effect is that the farmer subsi-
dizes the urban driver to a small extent.
The low premium rate is greatly affected by the fact that
traffic is almost unbelievably light in Saskatchewan. This is
due to the sparseness of population, the poor state of rural roads,
and the severe winter conditions which virtually drain the high-
ways of cars outside the urban centers for three months.
Every report on the Saskatchewan plan indicates that it is
working satisfactorily and is financially sound, despite the unbe-
lievably low premium rate. Over the four-year period from 1946
through 1949 the average loss ratio between premium earned
and losses incurred was only about sixty-five per cent. 3 If we
add to this the expense factor of eighteen per cent, it is clear that
a surplus is accumulating in the insurance fund which the gov-
ernment prepares to use either to reduce premiums further or
to add to benefits.
Private insurance is still possible under the Saskatchewan
scheme. Surprisingly enough, a study has revealed that private
carriers are maintaining their volume and in some cases are
increasing this substantially each year.8 4 Of course, however,
private insurers are not happy over the Saskatchewan plan.83
83. Id. at § 49.
84. Id. at § 37.
85. Many of the objections of private Insurers are clearly sound. See, for
instance, the report of the Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company of Mani-
toba which has been able to increase its business substantially despite the
state Insurance plan. This report points out that in several reports the effect
of the act Is to require private Insurers operating in the liability field to
subsidize the state system. No. 332 Ins. L. J. 702 (September 1950).
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Last year the Legislative Research Committee of North
Dakota made a careful study of the Saskatchewan scheme. The
North Dakota legislature was interested in an estimate of the
premium cost of such a scheme in North Dakota. For this pur-
pose the committee secured the services of the Chief Actuary
of the New York State Insurance Department. The study was
made on the spot, after a lengthy consideration of all factors that
could affect the comparative rates in the two areas. It was esti-
mated that the Saskatchewan compulsory coverage as described
could be maintained for private vehicles in North Dakota under
state insurance for about seventeen dollars and forty cents.88
86. Id. at § 57.
